12 Months On: How the 2025 Property Settlement Reforms Are Playing Out in Real Cases
Written by Joanne Bragg at Pippa Colman Family Law | Last Updated 22 September 2026
Introduction
On 10 June 2025 a raft of changes came into effect following the enactment of the Family Law Amendment Act 2024 (Amendment Act). Whilst not exclusively, the implementation of the amending act has primarily resulted in changes to proceedings for property alteration, in matters arising from a marriage or de facto relationship.
Whether the enactment of the Amendment Act has resulted in any significant change in outcomes from the pre-amendment legislation is a question that is, or should be, at the forefront of consideration for all participants, whether that be lawyers providing advice or individuals who find themselves needing to consider the provisions of the Family Law Act 1975.
This article focuses on a review of first instance decisions since the implementation of the changes from 10 June 2025 and considers the interplay with the amended legislation and pre-amendment case law. It will assess how, whilst there are some major changes, specifically with respect of add-backs, and the consideration of family violence, there have not been significant changes with how the Court is determining applications pursuant to section 79 (marriages) or section 90SM (de facto relationships).
Key takeaways
The Family Law Amendment Act 2024 took effect on 10 June 2025, changing how courts decide property settlement matters under section 79 (marriages) and section 90SM (de facto relationships).
Courts can no longer add back notional sums for wasted or dissipated assets that no longer exist -
following the Full Court’s decision in Shinohara & Shinohara [2025] FedCFamC1A 126.
Wastage and family violence are now express considerations when courts assess the parties; current and future circumstances.
Family violence is also an express consideration at the contributions stage, alongside the pre-amendment Kennon & Kennon line of authority.
One year on, first-instance decisions show courts still relying heavily on pre-amendment case law such as Stanford v Stanford, Hickey and Kennon.
The evidentiary bar remains high - courts continue to require clear evidence of family violence and its effect on contributions, not general assertions.
The Changes
The Amendment Act was passed by the Commonwealth Parliament on 10 December 2024. Whilst a small number of changes came into effect on 11 December 2024, the majority came into effect on 10 June 2025, and the substantive changes can be summarised as follows:
1. Codification of the process used by the Courts (as set out In the Marriage of Hickey [1]
2. Inclusion of family violence as a consideration at the contributions stage;
3. Inclusion of family violence, wastage, liabilities and housing needs as considerations at the current and
future circumstances stage;
4. Inclusion of family violence as a consideration when making decisions with respect to spousal
maintenance; and
5. Ability of the Court to make orders with respect to pets [2].
Additional changes with respect of disclosure, arbitration and application of the less adversarial approach were also enacted from the Amendment Act.
Application by Judges at first instance
There are numerous case law examples where Judges acknowledge the changes brought by the Amendment Act and set out the legislative process that they are required to follow. A clear example of this can be found in Her Honour Judge Tagilieri’s judgment in Stevens & Stevens [3], where the pathway is set out and references the earlier post amendment decision of Justice Austin in Division 1 of Pryor & Pryor (No 2) before proceeding to observe [4] “that the approach now required is not too different in substance to that previously required, and the Full Court in Shinohara & Shinohara [2025] FedCFamC1A 126 has clarified that, when determining what adjustment of interests should be ordered between parties, there should not be add-backs for notional sums found to have been wasted or otherwise dissipated or for the value of assets that no longer exist.”
Codification of the process
The steps required to be taken by Judges when deciding applications for the alteration of property interests pursuant to the Family Law Act, are now sent out in section 79 subsections (2), (3), (4), and (5) (marriage relationships) and in section 90SM subsections (2), (3), (4), and (5) (de facto relationships).
The case law, when applying the process set out in those sections, continues to refer to and act in accordance with pre-amendment authorities. For example, His Honour Judge Street, in Garnet & Garnet [5] sets out the legislative pathway, before proceeding to set out statements from Stanford v Stanford [6], Hickey, Bevan & Bevan [7], Perrin & Perrin (No 2) [8], and Dovgan & Dovgan [9].
The case law continues to show the use of both global and asset by asset approaches. See for example the decision of Her Honour Judge Colquhoun in Solas & Verbeek [10] where reference is made to the Court's "broad discretion" in "its approach to the assessment of parties to property", concluding that "while the global approach ... is more commonly used, an asset by asset approach may also be appropriate in some cases ..."
The holistic assessment of contributions also continues to be highlighted in the case law. Her Honour Judge A Humphreys in Mahanta & Win (No 2) [11] references the clear intention of parliament, when amending section 79 "that the court's consideration of these matters remain part of a holistic assessment of the respective contributions of the parties, reflecting the well-established principle at common law."
Addbacks
Arguably, one of the two changes that is referred to most commonly in case law is the case of Shinohara & Shinohara [12], being the decision of the Full Court, where the new s79(3)(a)(i) was assessed and a conclusion made that only existing legal and equitable rights and interests in any property of the parties at the time of trial were to be considered when making orders for a property alteration and that notional property, or add backs, that do not exist, "cannot be identified to form part of the balance sheet.[13]"
When setting out the pathway that the Court is required to follow, subsequent cases regularly reference Shinohara, or the impacts of the case. Examples include His Honour Brown's decision in Mahler & Mahler [14], where he refers to the observations of the Full Court in Shinohara that "It has always been self-evident that any property of the parties, or one of them, that was owned at some time in the past but no longer exists at the time of trial, cannot be adjusted or divided." His Honour proceeds to conclude [15] that "statements such as this, when read in conjunction with the recent amendments to the Act, eschew any notion that monies spent by a party on legal fees can be notionally added back into any tabulation of assets and then assigned to one or other of the parties. The same considerations apply to earlier injections of capital which can be attributed to one spouse alone." His Honour proceeds to reference wastage [16] and that "such matters may be considered at a later step of the process and as will be described shortly not accounted for in the direct manner of accounting envisaged in a dollar for dollar add back. Rather such issues are to be approached holistically."
It is clear from the cases that claims for addbacks that may have existed pre-amendments, will now be considered when assessing contributions or in consideration of the parties' current and future circumstances [17]. This can be seen in His Honour Judge Blake's decision in Clifton & Clifton [18], where in assessing current and future circumstances, the Court having found that the wife "embarked upon a course of conduct designed to minimise the asset pool of the parties at the expense of the husband", awarded the husband a 20% adjustment in his favour. This adjustment took into account, inter alia, the approximately $276,762 removed by the wife [19].
Wastage
The Court has long considered wastage by a party when assessing applications for property alteration pursuant to the Family Law Act [20]. The Amending Act inserted a provision that now requires the Court, when considering the current and future circumstances of the parties, to consider, as far as it is relevant, "the effect of any material wastage, caused intentionally or recklessly by a party to the marriage/de facto relationship, of property or financial resources of either of the parties to the marriage/de facto relationship or both of them." [21]
Post amendment case law regularly refers to statements and guidance from pre-amendment cases [22]. In Mahler, His Honour Judge Brown refers to wastage, arising under section 79(5)(d) needing to be "both material -- in the sense of being significant -- and either intentionally or recklessly incurred," before referencing [23] examples from the Explanatory Memorandum as "gambling losses; the reckless or intentional undermining of the profitability of a business; or allowing a third person to utilise the parties' property without proper payment."
Family Violence
Arguably, along with references to addbacks (Shinohara), references to a consideration of family violence at both the contributions and current and future circumstances stages of assessment is the most common change seen in case law post the amendments. Following the inclusion of s79(4)(ca)/s90SM(4)(ca), with respect of contributions, the Court is required to take into account, as far as it is relevant, "the effect of any family violence, to which one party to the marriage/de facto relationship has subjected or exposed the other party, on the ability of a party to the marriage/de facto relationship to the make the kind of contributions referred to in paragraphs (a), (b) and (c)" (being the financial, non-financial contributions and contributions to the welfare of the family). An expansive definition of family violence is set out in section 4AB of the Act, with additional examples of behaviour that might constitute economic or financial abuse included by the Amendment Act in subsection (2A).
With respect of contributions, Mahler, His Honour Judge Brown's notes [24] "the legislative underpinning regarding how the court is to assess contributions remain unchanged by recent amendment other than in one significant context" before referencing the inclusion of subsection (ca) in section 79.
The leading pre-amendment case is that of Kennon & Kennon [25]. In Mahler, His Honour Judge Brown, makes statements consistent with the Kennon line of authorities including [26] (at [280] -- [282]):
It is clear that there must be a nexus between the family violence alleged and the ability of the spouse subjected to make relevant contribution of the kinds stipulated in section 79(4)(a)(b) & (c). The court is directed to consider the economic impact of family violence. It is not to provide compensation to its victims or to punish its perpetrators ....
It also seems to me that, given the primary definition of family violence as conduct which result in the coercion or control of the person to whom it is directed or results in such a person being rendered fearful, any family violence which is relevant to the assessment of contributions must have one or both of these elements within it.
Thus, the conduct to be impugned is centred on how power (including financial power) is exercised in a marital relationship and the use of such power to control another family member. Thus, one spouse restricting the other spouse's access to money, though not intrinsically violent, can amount to family violence, if the person who is its object, feels controlled by the person withholding such support, particularly if one spouse is the entire or predominant source of financial support for the other.
Post amendment cases continue to regularly refer to pre-amendment cases and particularly the requirement for a nexus between the family violence and the effect on the contributions of a party [27].
Following the inclusion of s79(5)(a)/s90SM(5)(a), the Court is required to take into account, when assessing current and future circumstances, so far as it is relevant "the effect of any family violence, to which one party to the marriage/de facto relationship has subjected or exposed the other party, on the current and future circumstances of the other party, including on any of the matters mentioned elsewhere in" subsection 5.
When considering how the Court is required to assess current and future circumstances post the amending act, Judge Brown in Mahler refers [28] to the indication of the relevant Explanatory Memorandum, "that the object of section 79(5)(a) is to provide the court with a wide discretion to consider the economic impact of family violence on the current and future circumstances of the parties possibly in tandem with others of considerations arising under the section."
An example of where family violence has been assessed as relevant to the assessment of contributions and current and future circumstances can be seen in Mahanta & Win (No 2) [29], where Her Honour Judge A Humphreys concludes with respect of the effect of family violence on contributions:
I am satisfied on the evidence before me the wife's ability to make contributions since late 2023, to manage the business and make financial contributions, to care for the children and to make homemaker contributions, have all been greatly affected by the family violence she was subjected to by the husband and made extremely more difficult and challenging than it otherwise would have been. This weighs very heavily in favour of the wife pursuant to section 79(4)(ca).
With respect of current and future circumstances, the Court in Mahanta was "satisfied the wife's current and future circumstances have been affected to an extremely high degree by the family violence she was subjected to by the husband.[30]" The family violence in Mahanta was described as "extreme physical family violence, leaving her with permanent physical impairment and psychological injury" [31].
In Mahanta, reference is made to Victims of Crime Assistance, which in that case such assistance was received by the wife to meet the cost of counselling support. Her Honour stated [32] that "if the wife does have any further compensation entitlements, I find it just and equitable to disregard those potential entitlements pursuant to section 79(5). I do so noting the intention of Parliament as expressed in an amendment to the explanatory memorandum for the Family Law Amendment Bill 2024."
A further case (on an undefended basis), where the Wife's provided evidence as to incidents of family violence and made submission that the violence made her contributions more arduous than they would otherwise have been is that of Ebner & Yount [33]. In that decision Her Honour Judge Obradovic [34] refers to the Wife's evidence with respect to family violence and comments that "the husband's disengagement from the proceedings, his lack of contribution to the parties' joint debts and his overall cavalier attitude to the parties' finances is consistent with the history of coercive and controlling behaviour."
It is clear from post-amendments cases that the evidence must support that family violence occurred and that such violence had an effect on contributions or has an effect on the current or future circumstances of a party. An example of where evidence was led with respect to family violence is the case of Ling & Yahui (No 5) [35]. In that decision, His Honour Judge O'Shannessy [36] concluded that he was "not persuaded, on the evidence and on the balance of probabilities, that the assaults on her described in Ms Yahui's affidavit actually occurred" and states that he does "not have reliable evidence of those alleged events."
A further example is found in Loxford & Loxford [37], where Her Honour Judge Dorrat concludes that she is "unable to find on the evidence that the family violence committed by the husband against the wife impacted the wife's ability to make contributions to the asset pool in this case." This is despite a finding [38] that "incidents, to which the husband himself admits, are examples of family violence of a very serious and potentially lethal nature."
Arguably, what is not apparent from the case law is whether the consideration of family violence at both the contributions and the current and future circumstances stage has led to any expansion of the Kennon line of authorities. Whilst a reading of the first instance decisions certainly reveals increased reference to family violence as a consideration, it is not yet clear as to whether such inclusion has resulted in a difference in outcomes. It is submitted that it is probable that the cases where a Court has determined that family violence did impact contributions or is relevant to an assessment of current and future circumstances, would likely have had the same result pre-amendment.
Conclusion
Cases decided since the enactment of the Amendment Act on 10 June 2026 clearly show the new legislative pathway that the Court must follow when being tasked with applications for property alteration. It is apparent that pre-amendment cases remain relevant when following that pathway. This is particularly noticeable with respect of the steps the Court must take, in the assessment of "wastage" claims, and when assessing the impact of family violence.
It is not yet clear whether the inclusion of family violence in the legislation as a mandatory consideration (if relevant) at both the contributions and current and future circumstances stages, has resulted in parties being increasingly successful in litigating such a claim. It is clear that the Court continues to require evidence that is more that sweeping statements and generalisations.
The impacts arising from the wording of the pathway in the legislation, and the subsequent application of that by the Court in Shinohara, has had arguably the most significant impact that can be seen from a review of first instance decisions. Given that a mathematical process is no longer permitted (by adding back a specific amount), the approach to premature dissipation of assets is arguably more nuanced than pre-amendment and requires increased consideration of how to satisfy the Court of the relevance of any such dissipation to the assessment of contributions and current and future circumstances.
Making an application to the Court for property alteration should be approached with careful consideration by litigants and practitioners alike. At Pippa Colman Family Law we offer specialised family law advice and can assist with providing advice and representation for all such applications.
Case citations
(2003) 30 Fam LR 355.
Referred to as "companion animals".
[2026] FedCFamC2F 376 at [5] through [8].
At [9].
[2025] FedCFamC2F 1356 at [121]-[136].
(2012) 247 CLR 108.
(2013) FLC 93-545.
[2018] FamCAFC 122.
[2021] FamCA 306.
[2026] FedCFamC2F 782 at [96].
[2026] FedCFamC2F 463 at [62].
[2025] FedCFamC1A 126.
At [127].
[2026] FedCFamC2F 639 at [212].
At [213].
At [214].
As referenced in Laurier & Brenton (No 5) [2026] FedCFamC2F 908 at [213].
[2026] FedCFamC2F 796.
At [61].
Kowaliw & Kowaliw (1981) FLC 91-092, Omacini (2005) FLC 93-218.
Section 79(5)(d), Section 90SM(5)(d).
For example, see Stevens & Stevens [2026] FedCFamC2F 376 at [56], Clifton & Clifton [2026] FedCFamC2F 796 at [90].
At [294].
At [273].
(1997) FLC 92-757
At [280] -- [282].
See for example in Mahanta & Win (No 2) [2026] FedCFamC2F 463 at [89] where the Court refers to Benson & Drury (2020) FamCAFC 303 and Laurier & Brenton (No 5) [2026] FedCFamC2F 908 at [216] where the Court refers to Kennon & Kennon (1997) 22 Fam LR 1 and at [217] where the Court refers to Martell & Martell [2023] FedCFamC1A 71.
At [292].
[2026] FedCFamC2F 463 at [93].
Mahanta & Win (No 2) [2026] FedCFamC2F 463 at [103].
Mahanta & Win (No 2) [2026] FedCFamC2F 463 at [87].
At [112].
[2026] FedCFamC2F 599.
At [76].
[2026] FedCFamC2F 620.
At [233] and [239].
[2026] FedCFamC2F 876 at [78].
At [71].
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The Family Law Amendment Act 2024 codified the court's decision-making process for property alteration and added family violence, wastage, liabilities and housing needs as express considerations under sections 79 and 90SM of the Family Law Act 1975.
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No. Following Shinohara & Shinohara [2025] FedCFamC1A 126, only existing legal and equitable interests in property at the time of trial can be divided — notional add-backs for assets that no longer exist cannot form part of the balance sheet. Wastage is instead considered holistically as part of the parties' current and future circumstances.
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Family violence can now be taken into account both when assessing a party's contributions and when assessing their current and future circumstances, provided there is a clear nexus between the violence and its effect — consistent with the pre-amendment Kennon & Kennon line of authority.
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Based on a review of first-instance decisions in the 12 months since the reforms commenced, the legislative pathway has changed but the practical approach to wastage and family violence in most cases would likely have reached a similar result under the pre-amendment law.
Contact Pippa Colman Family Law today to discuss how we can help you.
Important Disclaimer
The above information is general in nature and provided for educational and informational purposes only. It is not legal advice and should not be relied on as such. Every situation is different, and you should seek independent legal advice before making decisions about your own circumstances.